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Religion and Politics in Africa:
The Future of “The Secular” 
Jon Abbink 
Abstract: This essay discusses the continued importance that religion 
holds in African life, not only in terms of numbers of believers, but also 
regarding the varieties of religious experience and its links with politics 
and the “public sphere(s)”. Coinciding with the wave of democratization 
and economic liberalization efforts since about 1990, a notable growth of 
the public presence of religion and its political referents in Africa has 
been witnessed; alongside “development”, religion will remain a hot issue 
in the future political trajectory of the continent. Its renewed presence in 
public spheres has also led to new understandings of what religion means 
and how it figures into both “world-making” and identity politics. This 
will prolong the challenges associated with the role and status of religion 
in the “secular state model” found in most African countries. Can these 
states, while “besieged” by believers, maintain neutrality among diverse 
worldviews, and if so, how? The paper discusses these issues in a general 
manner with reference to African examples, some taken from fieldwork 
by the author, and makes a philosophical argument for the development 
of a new kind of “secular state” that can respect the religious commit-
ments of African populations. 
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This essay is inspired by the observation that while we see continued 
strong religious adherence among people in Africa, most are living in 
“secular states”. How do these two phenomena coalesce, and will the 
secular model last? Next to issues of “development”, this question will 
animate much of the future political debate in Africa.1 
Few people would contest the continued importance that religion 
holds in African life, in terms of not only numbers of adherents, but also 
the vast scope of religious experiences and the links between religion and 
politics and public life. Recent decades – coinciding with the wave of de-
mocratization and economic liberalization efforts starting in about 1990 – 
have also shown unrelenting growth in the public presence of religion in 
Africa. This phenomenon has produced numerous new studies and sub-
fields of research, as well as broader understandings of what religion 
means and how it functions in “world-making” and in political life.  
Obviously, this surge is characteristic not only of Africa and African 
Studies – it is a global phenomenon. But one could claim that discus-
sions on religion, politics and the “public sphere”, and by implication the 
“secular state model”,2 now make Africa, which is marked by vibrant 
religious life, a prime case for the comparative study of the relationship 
between politics and religion.  
The term “public sphere” is somewhat worn-out, and partly mythical. 
It is not some idealized domain of free and rational discussion, but any 
arena where people and constituencies interact, present points of view, 
make claims, impose on others or try to get the upper hand. It is often 
identified with the mass media and state ceremonies, but it is of course 
wider than that. There are many “public spheres” where clashes of opin-
ion, debates and claim-making occur, and, empirically speaking, research 
could start in any of these spheres. Obviously, as the so-called “Arab 
Spring” revolts have shown us, the new social media and Internet-based 
services are one domain – or, rather, many fragmented domains – that 
1  I am grateful to the organizers and the audience of the Conference in Pilsen for 
their critical remarks and questions. 
2  For example, see Norris and Inglehart 2004; Hackett 2005; An-Na’im 2008; 
Habermas 2008, 2011; Butler et al. 2011; Igwe 2014. 
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emerged in the shadow of the classical print and audio-visual media, which 
are often suppressed. But, for example, art performances, concerts and 
religious/cultural festivals in which different religious actors participate are 
also “public spheres”. In this general paper, I will discuss that theme with 
reference to several African examples, notably from the Horn of Africa, 
partly based on my own field research over the past few years. 
To give a definition of religion is difficult, but we need one. Ken-
neth Burke, the noted literary theorist and rhetorician, talked about reli-
gion as “equipment for living”. And Clifford Geertz’s famous anthro-
pological definition of religion as a “system of symbols” is perhaps too 
well known to be quoted here, but its emphasis on psychological, socio-
cognitive aspects makes it salient.3 We can still subscribe to such notions. 
But I define religion here, beyond the more specific, Western, “theologi-
cal” definition, as follows: a belief in the existence and workings of spir-
itual beings or divine forces, and the recognition of an invisible order or 
reality that affects humans and their behaviour. This order always has a 
transcendental, supra-individual dimension and refers to perceived an-
cestor spirits, creator beings or forces “beyond”. Religion in this sense is, 
in principle, value-neutral and often seen as a fact of being in the world. 
One can also consider a secondary aspect of religion: a way to affirm or 
manipulate identity that is based on people’s commitment to this invisi-
ble order in some form. Religion is also a deeply felt commitment and a 
collective “instrument” of community formation, thus often leading to a 
“politics of identity”. Religion is not necessarily a discourse of morality 
(Stark 2004: 470-71), and indeed, as Ellis and ter Haar (1998: 197-8) have 
suggested, political leaders’ use of religion, including in Africa, is often 
highly dubious and opportunistic – a way to keep power and influence 
others. We can recognize and take into account certain African religious 
vocabularies as codifying mindsets to apprehend the world – some ob-
servers here even speak of “epistemologies” (Ellis and ter Haar 2007). 
But as this conscious reinvention and use of these presumed “epistemol-
ogies” by modern-day politicians to stay in power makes clear, they can-
not be taken at face value and are not immune to criticism. So, from an 
analytical vantage point, not from one of believers, to critically assess the 
moral power and the wider claims of a religious configuration – against a 
3  He said: “Religion is: (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish power-
ful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formu-
lating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these con-
ceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations 
seem uniquely realistic.” Clifford Geertz (1973), Religion as a Cultural System, 
in: Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, New York: Basic Books, 90. 
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relativist acceptance of all “religious” expression – remains necessary and 
is indeed possible. In practice, the nature and impact of religion in public 
life is continuously being evaluated and discussed – by believers, non-
believers, citizens and analysts. 
Figures: The Pew Surveys as an Entry into 
Religious Life in Africa 
Psychologist Nigel Barber predicted in 2012 that globally “non-believ-
ers” would surpass religious believers by 2038 (Barber 2012), as stand-
ards of living would improve in many countries (see also Norris and 
Inglehart 2004). He defined this as 50 per cent or more of the population 
“disbelieving in God” or being what he called “atheist”. We may not live 
to see the outcome of this prediction, but we have reason to doubt it, 
certainly in the case of Africa. A quick look at recent figures from the 
well-known Pew Research Center surveys shows that religion is not 
declining in Africa, and that more affluence does not necessarily corre-
late with loss of faith. In 2010, 69 to 98 per cent of inhabitants (depend-
ing on the country) were believers in God, the literal truth of the scrip-
tures and Biblical or Qur’anic rules, went to mosque or church regularly, 
and followed most other religious injunctions. Nine out of ten said that 
religion was “very important” in their lives (Pew Forum 2010: 3). Prac-
tices like sacrifices to spirits and ancestors were seen as important by ap-
proximately 27 per cent of all people, reflecting the continued relevance 
of such so-called “traditional” religious practices. Striking also were the 
figures on support for Biblical or shari’a/Qur’anic law: The median fig-
ure of Christians across African countries who supported making the 
Bible “the official law of the land” was 60 per cent; among Muslims 
referring to the Qur’an, the corresponding figure was 63 per cent: clear 
majorities (Pew Forum 2010: 11).4 In most countries, more than half of 
Christians also believe in the “prosperity gospel”, meaning that God will 
grant them wealth and good health if they have or show enough faith 
(Pew Forum 2010: 2). From 66 to 93 per cent of people wanted their 
political leaders to have strong religious beliefs; most even agreed to their 
being of a faith different from their own (Pew Forum 2010: 52). Re-
markable exceptions here were Tanzania, where only 35 per cent support 
religious leaders’ involvement in politics, and Ethiopia, where 63 per 
cent of the people actually oppose religious leaders involving themselves 
4  But this position was especially strong when Muslims were a minority in their 
country. 
 Religion and Politics in Africa 87 
in politics (although they do not necessarily reject politicians who have 
religious beliefs or participate openly in religious events as private citi-
zens). These are all telling figures – despite the methodological critiques 
that could be directed towards the Pew surveys. One could hypothesize 
that religion has even become the primary identity for most Africans, 
perhaps above national identity, which is seen as more unstable. Barber’s 
prediction has a long way to go before becoming a reality. 
The aspect of identity assertion via religion is all the more relevant 
now that virtually all religious communities in Africa live in conditions of 
pluralism – meaning, they know of other religious traditions, but also 
experience pluralism within their own religion. Due to this inevitable 
need to relate to others within the context of the state, the political as-
pect gains relevance. I maintain, therefore, that this pluralism, which is 
strongly connected to the phenomenon of “modernity” in its multiple 
forms, remains a challenge that must always be addressed, and raises 
questions for both politics and any religious tradition. Nowhere is this 
challenge more apparent than in Africa, where the diversity and variety 
of denominations and streams of religious practice are quite remarkable. 
Some of the elements especially striking in African religious life are its 
strong performative, publicly enacted presence and its materially explicit 
series of practices – ceremonies, participatory rituals and prayer gather-
ings, and acoustically enhanced religious services – all claiming space, 
and not necessarily all peaceful or harmonious. 
Dominant Themes in Research on Religion  
in Africa 
Research on religions and religious cultures has been advancing rapidly 
in African Studies. In fact, the depth and the richness of recent work are 
remarkable. But comparative study is often lacking. In what follows, I 
first briefly mention three notable, current research emphases and then 
move on to the main topic: the status of “the secular”. 
New Ethnography and Historiography of Religion: 
Examples from the Horn of Africa 
Ethnographic studies of the past 10 to 15 years have underlined the 
wealth of Christian, Muslim and “traditional” or “ethno-religious” cul-
tures in Africa. They reveal a fascinating complexity and depth of exist-
ing religious traditions, which signify much more than politics or security 
issues. Apart from ongoing work on textual traditions and new ap-
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proaches to ritual, many studies have produced new views on the varie-
ties of everyday religious practice, the materialities of religion, and per-
sonal religious experiences and changes due to conversion. This is evi-
dent in, among other studies, recent publications on Evangelical-Pente-
costal beliefs in Ethiopia, which have greatly increased since the early 
1990s (see, for example, Haustein 2011a, 2011b; Freeman 2012; Haustein 
and Fantini 2013; Tibebe Eshete 2013). Some view the growth of this 
faith in an already majority-Christian country as unexpected, but that 
would be a superficial judgment on the dynamics of religion in a mod-
ernizing society. Islam and Christianity have undergone significant global 
reconnections to religious institutions, associations and networks outside 
the national state context as well as internal transformations, in this pro-
cess evincing both reinvention and denominational change. The result is 
that in Ethiopia the “ethno-religions” are declining rapidly, despite some 
hybrid forms here and there retaining adherents.  
The nature of religious experiences in the Horn of Africa has been 
shown to be quite varied, made clear by research on healing practices, 
mediums, pilgrimages, reformist-revivalist movements, customary forms 
of spirituality, neotraditional rituals, and saints and shrines as focal points 
of local religious practice. I recall my visit a couple of years back to a Mus-
lim monastery-like settlement (around a shrine, or zawiyya) of the Qadiriyya 
Sufi order in northern Ethiopia. It catered to the local Muslim community 
and provided a place of refuge and reflection, if not rehabilitation, for 
young, urban Muslims struggling with their personal identity and future 
(see Abbink 2008). Its leaders played a mediatory role and also reverber-
ated with a relaxed attitude – which was for them self-evident – towards 
other believers, Muslim or Christian, as they searched for divine inspiration 
and harmony. This attitude could be said to aid in the formation of a pan-
local culture of religious coexistence that might even be used as a model 
for wider networks of coexistence. A similar story could be told of Ortho-
dox Christian church or monastic retreats and other places of pilgrimage 
and worship. Christianity in its various guises – from Orthodox to 
Protestant-Evangelical and Pentecostal – shows a commitment to social 
and personal improvement and moral codes that are vital on the local and 
parish levels and that define the life-worlds of its adherents. In these loca-
tions, the sphere of (party) politics and administration is deemed irrelevant 
and to be avoided, but religious institutions can work out accommodative 
relations with it, notably on the local level.  
Another example of religious “coexistence” from fieldwork (in 
Wollo, northern Ethiopia) is that of the mediating, not purely religious, 
role of local Muslim leaders and Orthodox-Christian as well as more 
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traditional spirit mediums or local experts called abagars to help people 
solve disputes concerning family, insults, land, debt and other issues. 
These abagars (“fathers of the land”) worked to find common ground 
between two parties, based on shared underlying principles of piety and 
justice, in a way that a state court could not do. They thereby constructed 
a reflexive moral authority acceptable to all. Characteristic here was the 
irrelevance of the specific religious allegiance of those involved: While the 
abagars were usually of Muslim background, both Christian and Muslim 
litigants accepted their verdict, which was not based on shari’a law.  
So here, as in many other African societies, religious leaders are not 
only community leaders and preachers, but also moral authorities playing 
mediating roles in solving local conflicts even between people of differ-
ent faiths or denominations. One could make the case that these reli-
gious intermediaries are successful precisely because they do not assume 
any political role. On this basis they gain authority and claim adherence – 
while at the same time respecting and affirming the identity of their “cli-
ents” in their own respective religions. Similar examples can be cited 
from across Africa of such successful religious intermediaries, although 
not all of them stay out of politics. 
Many anthropological field studies of religious culture show us the 
intermingling or “hybridity” of traditions, as seen during pilgrimages to a 
holy site or shrine. For one example, in his fascinating description of 
religious life in Gamo, southern Ethiopia, Tadesse Wolde (2007) de-
scribes how four different religious denominations come together during 
a festival focused on one particular sacred place that is historically de-
voted to an old Orthodox Church object, the Gabriel tabot (the symbolic 
replica of the covenantal Ark). Here, different religious meanings at-
tached to the place by these four groups were enacted almost simultane-
ously in this semiannual festival in a spirit of mutual forbearance and 
tolerance. Such an accommodative attitude cannot be assumed among all 
believer groups. But this kind of practice of shared meaning creation in 
public (religious) space provides a kind of archetypical model of overlap-
ping or syncretic celebration. It could be elaborated upon as a model of 
religious relations in a wider domain, as a temporary suspension of dif-
ference based on the recognition of the overarching shared values of 
piety and spirituality. 
A second major theme of research is that of the “mediatization” of 
religion and religious identities. Religious elites and younger generations 
using new information and communication technologies and social me-
dia has been one of the big developments of the past two decades. The 
ways in which mediatization has changed, simplified and sharpened the 
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religious message, and transformed the practising of religion as well as 
enhanced religious rivalry, is a growing field of interest. Major things are 
happening here: The study of how religious groups use the media has led 
to a broader understanding both of what “religion” is and of specific 
adaptations and transformations of religious ideas and values. Media are 
now (also) to be understood as “sensory technologies” that extend tradi-
tional forms of embodied religion in, for example, rituals, bodily modifi-
cations and initiations. All this has not produced a toning down of reli-
gious assertiveness or a sense of modernist relativism; on the contrary, it 
seems inevitably to have hardened boundaries and competition via chal-
lenging polemics in mosques and church compounds, on VCDs and on 
YouTube and other sites. Dramatic public performances and calls for 
conversion are prevalent. Consumers of religious images and messages in 
audio or visual form become more entrenched in the ideas and symbol-
ism used: They internalize a different model of religious functioning and 
identity experience, but externalize it in the public sphere through em-
phatic performance.  
As much recent work has shown, this in many cases also leads to a 
decline in trans-religious empathy or coexistence, and this is a challenge, 
particularly for the state order. This decline is visible in many interreli-
gious contexts and in virtually every religious conflict in the world today. 
Studies along these lines have also shown how the versatile use of media 
has projected religious groups onto the national stage and into global 
cyberspace. The massive use of multiple media and the resulting frag-
mentation of (social and political) constituencies have clear implications 
for political theory and representative politics. This was demonstrated as 
early as in the so-called “Arab Spring” revolts. 
A third core theme is that of religion and identity – or rather, the 
politics of religious identity in public spheres. This has become a strongly 
emphasized area of research in African Studies, informed by global dis-
cussions on religious competition, postcolonial state identity, (multiple) 
modernity as a socio-economic phenomenon, and the problems of the 
secular state model. Such studies are in part informed by the refutation 
of one version of “secularization theory”: In many developing countries 
– in contrast to Europe, for example – religion has not moved to the 
private sphere, and people have not become less religious or less vocal in 
the public domain; indeed, they have become more so. Religious identi-
ties are re-emerging and more emphatic. One example of religion’s role 
in the politics of identity in Ethiopia is the Oromo people’s Waaqeffata 
(see Osmond 2004.) In this modern version of a traditional belief, we see 
a political dimension in that Oromo pose Waaqeffata as a counter-reli-
 Religion and Politics in Africa 91 
gion to Christianity and Islam (seen as religions of hegemonic groups) 
and “return” to (what they see as) the “real, original Oromo religion” as 
a form of cultural nationalism, with underlying political aspects.  
Religion as identity can obviously take on another face and demon-
strate its potential as a channel for conflict generation, whereby an exclu-
sivist discourse fuelled by absolutist notions of right and wrong is quickly 
produced. A recent example (from 2014) is the conflict in the Central 
African Republic (CAR), allegedly between Christians and Muslims, a 
violent confrontation in the wake of insurgent activities of a rebel group, 
which produced a communal war in which hundreds of members of 
both faiths attacked each other and were killed. People justified their 
violence by religion. The language was uncompromising, and the sudden, 
group-based hatred of the other, remarkable. The conflict was drawn 
along “religious” lines probably because in the CAR – for many analysts 
a “failed state” in a volatile region – the religious idiom was the only way 
to mobilize people. Clearly, issues of political, economic and regional 
disparity played a role, but apparently there was nothing else to “unite” 
people. In the absence of an effective state or legal-political order, reli-
gion by default becomes the prime identification mechanism. 
The vast array of recent studies of religion in Africa shows notable 
progress and new levels of understanding, in terms of not only the cul-
tural semantics but also how the religious and the political interact and 
are often mutually constituted. Current work combines analyses of 
meaning systems and of personal strategies of religious identification 
with the collective, organizational dimension. Studies of religion in Af-
rica are thus more than ever geared towards a relational understanding 
and an analysis of its societal contexts of production, and much inter-
esting work is being done on the particular articulations and adaptations 
of these traditional religions to new local contexts and global influences. 
On a personal note, when I studied rituals among the Me’en people in 
southwest Ethiopia in the 1990s, I made a fairly “local” study of their 
religion and did not have to contend with the presence of, for example, 
Evangelical-Pentecostal groups. I was able to describe a virtually auton-
omous local tradition that was concerned with ethno-religious rituals 
geared to Me’en cultural premises and group life, with strong environ-
mental referents (Abbink 1995). At the time, what struck me was a well-
rooted tradition of managing social and environmental relations within a 
community not so much concerned with cosmology or expressing a 
system of dogmas or with an ethics of in- and exclusion. Today, how-
ever, these same people are rapidly adjusting to religious “moderniza-
tion” and have for the larger part adopted Evangelical beliefs – virtually 
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within one generation. The new faith, of course, has provided avenues of 
self-empowerment and connection to audiences and solidarity networks 
outside their own group. But their new elite spokesmen – often of the 
younger generation – have also turned inimical towards many of their 
own pre-conversion traditions. These two aspects of “worldview mod-
ernization” have been described often and account for much of the new 
religious dynamic in Africa. Clearly, they also extend into the political 
domain, especially in terms of the aforementioned identity politics. 
The Public Sphere and Secular State in Africa 
The fact of religion being an easily available and suitable “instrument” of 
mobilization, on the basis of perceived spiritual or divine forces recog-
nized by people, has implications for the management of the “public 
sphere” – in other words, for the debates on the form and future of the 
secular state model still in place in many African countries. This is the 
main point I wish to discuss further.  
In fact, a majority of African states have no state religion. Despite its 
ambiguous origin under colonial regimes, the “secular model” was held 
onto by postcolonial political leaders as they believed it would facilitate 
religious freedom and dampen religious conflict. The idea was that this – 
in principle, at least – would also spare the public sphere the aggressive 
rhetoric, competition and monopolizing discourse in the name of religion. 
We note, however, that African governments today grapple with this more 
and more, because religious pressures are increasing due to religion’s 
growth as the primary identity of people there (cf. Diagne 2009; Igwe 
2014). We saw this pressure in Kenya around both the adoption of the 
new 2010 constitution5 and the recent family and marriage bills6 (6), in 
Mali in the resistance to the new family law (withdrawn from the parlia-
mentary vote) – not to mention the 2013–14 revolts in the north in the 
name of religion and ethnicity – and in South Africa, where religious inter-
est groups pressured the state leadership and blamed the high rates of 
crime and violence on the “immoral secular order” (cf. Prozesky 2009). In 
Senegal, according to some analysts, the great vision of Léopold S. Sen-
ghor and his Muslim PM, Mamadou Dia, on the secular state and mod-
5  Christian leaders opposed its allowing of abortion, the entrenchment of Islamic 
legal courts, and the limits on freedom of worship. 
6  Contested by Muslims because it gave state law the upper hand over shari’a law 
on certain personal and family matters. 
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ernization has failed under their successors,7 who allowed Islamic groups/ 
agendas to affect the government and blur the boundaries between state 
authority and the Muslim (Sufi) orders (Diagne 2009: 12).  
Many problems connected to the secular state order in Africa are 
caused by regimes not observing the law they purport to uphold. They 
also selectively respond to religious pressure in order to divide and rule. 
Example cases can be cited from Tanzania, Uganda and Nigeria. In 
Ethiopia, where a notably increased number of violent incidents between 
believers of Muslim, Evangelical and Orthodox backgrounds was regis-
tered, it has been shown that the government often does not intervene in 
time or effectively sanction culprits. Such policies contribute to a decline 
in everyday practices of toleration and accommodation among Christians 
and Muslims and can lead to the subversion of the local social fabric.  
None of the postcolonial deceptions in developing an efficient sec-
ular state that respects people’s religious allegiances by definition invali-
date the secular model as a regulative idea for the formal political arena. 
But the African context, where “public spheres” exist on various levels, 
indeed produces a different model for a possible secular accommodative 
arrangement. Religion manifests itself in multiple contexts – family law, 
constitutional preferences, civil and personal rights (relating to religious 
dress and gender relations, among other things), the scope and extent of 
religious expression in public media, propagandistic strategies of religious 
groups – and these public spheres are thereby reconfigured, “religion-
ized” so to speak. Needless to say, the public sphere is not the same as 
the state, because laws, rules and state regulations are subject to a differ-
ent, more formal debate in the legislature (parliament) or within the 
executive branch, and are the result of a kind of “adaptation/conver-
sion” process for which the happenings in the public sphere provide the 
input (Habermas 2011: 25-26). In addition, in Africa the pressure to 
expand religious demands to the “public sphere” will regularly be met by 
controversy and resistance. It is not at all certain that abandoning the 
secular statute of a state based on the demand of a religious majority will 
work in the latter’s favour or enhance the free observance of religion. 
Interesting in the recent, more than two-year-long confrontation be-
tween the Muslim community and the state in Ethiopia is that the Mus-
lims demanded religious freedom and non-interference from the gov-
ernment on the basis of the secular model: They demand that it be re-
spected, not abrogated (Abbink 2014). 
7  Many Senegalese recall with irritation the moment when the then President 
Abdoulaye Wade prostrated himself before the leader of the Muslim Mouride 
Brotherhood back in December 2007, a highly symbolic act. See Seck 2010. 
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Religion and the Public Sphere in Africa:  
Secularization?
So, what is happening in the public sphere: secularization, or more reli-
gious colouring? 
While religion is becoming more important in African life, this is a 
process that creates new challenges for society. Demands from various 
religious constituencies towards the public sphere and the state are 
growing, and this creates inevitable friction, first because the state elites 
emanate from dominant groups within the population and need to meet 
the demands of their constituency. They are susceptible to informal 
political pressure, often via patron–client links. Second, parochial narra-
tives clash, all the more so when the legal order of a state is not secular 
but has recognized one religion as the “state religion”. This puts the 
status of “the secular” in doubt. 
Of course, the terms “secular” and “secularization” need to be ap-
proached cautiously.8 What is obviously refuted in sociological-religious 
studies is the strong version of the secularization thesis (Casanova 
2006a): the modernization and rationalization of life do not universally 
make religion irrelevant – there is no inevitable process of peo-
ples/societies losing or neglecting religious faith under these conditions. 
As a social fact, secularization does occur in certain historical epochs, but 
is dependent on certain specific conditions and processes. Obviously, in 
phases of Western societal development since the massive industrializa-
tion of the late nineteenth century, secularization in the above sense has 
occurred, coupled with a gradual expansion of the idea of “disenchant-
ment” (Entzauberung) of the world, in Max Weber’s terms, and a decen-
tring of God as an active force in planetary and human history. 
Another version of the secularization thesis, stating that religion 
under modernization and affluence is relegated entirely to the “private 
sphere”, has not been corroborated either: Witness the case of the USA.  
But the third version of the theory, that religious institutions and 
norms are gradually differentiated from statecraft and governance (Casa-
nova 2006a: 12), is still plausible and upheld by many cases, notably in 
Europe and India, but also in Africa. It provides the possibility of a secular 
state model in a religious society, and this was actively pursued as a politi-
cal ideal in postcolonial Africa. Several proponents of this view state as the 
8  I will not go into the long anthropological debates on this term following the 
major contribution of Talal Asad in his book Formations of the Secular (Stanford 
2003), but his approach has led to very fruitful reconsiderations and revisions 
of the subject and has redefined the research agenda. 
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reason for a secular statute that religion is not a purely benign, untouchable 
domain of life that would or should be off-limits to law-giving by the state. 
There is no decisive argument that would refute the value of a sec-
ular state as a model in interreligious politics and accommodation; it may 
still hold promise for the equitable treatment of religious communities 
and institutionalization of religious freedoms for two main reasons: 
 Pervasive diversity of religious and other worldviews in Africa is an 
incontrovertible fact. This is even the case in so-called “100 per cent 
Muslim” countries, because there the fault lines lie between Shi’ism 
and Sunnism, diverse schools of Islamic law, relevant ethnicities, 
and various strands and sects such as the Ahmadiyya, Isma’ilis, Ala-
wites, Druze and others. Come what may, a neutral political order 
would, theoretically speaking, do justice to the recognition of diver-
sity and of the need to work out structures of tolerance.  
 There are also citizenship issues at play: Whatever concept of citi-
zenship is pursued by a state, it is always defined beyond people’s 
religious identity.9 
This story holds for Africa in general, and also specifically for northeast 
Africa. In particular, one could claim that in the aforementioned conflict 
between the Muslim community and the Ethiopian state – with key 
Muslim leaders still on trial – an improved secular state model can be 
workable. It is upheld by Muslims as the constitutional ideal which they 
claim they respect but the government does not (Abbink 2014). That 
respect is probably conditional on a state’s democratic dispensation and 
on its upholding minimum constitutional principles on human, citizens’ 
and community rights. 
Religion as Political Debate?
Challenges for the Future 
The “public spheres” in Africa are dominated by multiple discourses, and 
it appears that today discourses dominated by religion can be expressed 
more freely than those dominated by politics. Religious freedoms seem to 
legally and practically hold priority over media and political freedoms, 
which are strongly restricted in countries such as Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sudan 
and Eritrea. How do these religious products and exchanges dominate the 
public sphere in Africa? How far is their expansion allowed to go? Is there 
9  In addition, the formal secularism of the state may be a good façade behind 
which to push informal, pragmatic politics towards workable deals, without re-
course to “inappropriate” religious justification. 
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a future for the secularism that is nominally declared? Many misunder-
standings about the concept exist, in Africa and among analysts, many of 
whom declared this idea dead “because of” the presence and force of 
religion. The purpose of secularism, however, is to fill the need for coex-
istence in the face of a social landscape of durable diversity and pluralism 
(see Scott 2000). Religion-based claims invite regulation in the context of 
wider national agendas or in that of determining the state’s identity as a 
policy arena where other legitimizing discourses are also present. The 
“secular challenge” thus will not go away, because the alternative, a faith-
based polity – such as in Ethiopia in the days of the Christian empire with 
the Ethiopian Orthodox Church as the state church, and such as we still 
have with “state Islam” in Sudan and in northern Nigerian states – is not a 
clear-cut or acceptable case for all citizens, pluralist as they are in their 
loyalties, cultural commitments and views on religious identity, even within 
their own faith community. And the record of such more “theocratically” 
based polities, like today’s Sudan, is not good at all, in view of the ongoing 
slaughter of fellow Muslims in Darfur and the Nuba Mountains, and given 
the repressive domestic politics (see also Keddie 2003: 30).  
In addition, as Leo Igwe (2014) and others have recently noted, 
there has been a systematic underestimation of the formulas of what we 
would now call “secularism”, or more “worldly” power, that existed in 
traditional/precolonial African societies. For instance, in Somalia, the 
religious leader (wadaad) was clearly distinguished from the political/war 
leader (waranle) (Lewis 1963), who had a different “job description”. 
When I did research among the agro-pastoral Suri people in southwest 
Ethiopia, I noted a similar dualism, and when I asked if the priest-like 
ritual leader (komoru) would not also be better as the political leader of 
the Suri in their relations with, for example, the government, I received a 
negative reply. The komoru had his own domain, and the administration 
of business, political matters or war with neighbouring groups was the 
domain of the reigning spokesmen of the age set, although the latter did 
not mind being “blessed” by the komoru.10 
A case could be made that the problem of state-religious rule came 
to the fore only in the colonial period, as colonial states usually imported 
a package deal whereby (the Christian) religion was allied to their rule. Its 
status was viewed ambivalently and often evoked resistance. Before the 
colonial state, Muslim conquerors – for instance, in West Africa – did 
the same, importing a new ideology of theocratic rule that was somewhat 
10  A similar but more intricate structure is found among the Boran Oromo in Ethio-
pia and Kenya and their gaadaa age-grading system and indigenous religion. 
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problematic.11 The examples I mentioned earlier of Gamo and Suri are 
just a few illustrating that political-administrative and religious perfor-
mance were not the same thing in many parts of Africa (Igwe 2014). 
The modern postcolonial state regularly “problematized” the rela-
tionship between religious office holders and the state administration. 
But the state is bound to the constitutional principles nominally declared 
by itself, and is increasingly globalized in its juridical orientation. It needs 
a kind of religion–state separation, or at least mutual positioning, in the 
policy arena. It is possible to build on the traditions recognizing the two 
different domains, as in the examples above, to work out new models of 
interaction – again, to do justice to the religious and worldview pluralism 
that will not go away. Nonetheless, political expediency, informal power 
politics of local elites, and failing service provision by the modern state 
have undermined the viability of this effort.  
A very obvious feature of religious competition today, which demon-
strates the dilemmas of religion in the public sphere, are the “sound wars”, 
the amplified proclamations of faith-based messages in urban space, ema-
nating from prayer houses, churches and mosques. This style of “commu-
nication” emerged in the era of political liberalization, especially since the 
early 1990s, and rapidly capitalized on technological-mechanical innova-
tions in media. The sound battles clearly go beyond the mere signalling 
function of religious messages (to, for example, indicate the beginning of a 
service): Now entire services are broadcast via loudspeakers to willing and 
unwilling listeners any time. This is a paradoxical and literal case of religion 
in the public space, as it is often infringing on the rights of others and not 
in accordance with national laws.12 These sound wars have not yet been 
the subject of much research, but they seem to be a form of intimidation, 
and may reflect a concrete case of mimetic rivalry, in René Girard’s words 
(Girard 1987; cf. also Tincq 2001), between religious groups not wanting 
to “give in” and attempting to reassert their public presence. Field research 
would be needed to find out more about the motives for acoustic over-
production, the nature of the transmitted “religious” messages that has 
changed over time, the apparent intimidation of the state authorities, and 
the effects on public policy, health13 and interfaith relations – for one, the 
11  Reflections of this can be seen in the famous film by Ousmane Sembène, Ceddo 
(1977), online: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9ipcync79CI> (10 April 
2014). 
12  For example, in Ethiopia there is a legal injunction (one rarely enforced) to keep 
religious sound within certain limits. 
13  See Armah et al. (2010). Also, the denials by religious leaders in Kenya and 
Nigeria, cited in Fayali 2012 and Macharia 2009, and the comment “Don’t 
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rapid escalation of violent clashes. Interestingly, community responses 
towards the acoustic onslaught are not only positive or indifferent, and 
indeed some voices are emerging to curb the trend. 
In this respect, the core of this “secular challenge” (or challenge of 
pluralism) is nicely summed up by Jürgen Habermas: 
It is not enough to rely on the mere benevolence of a secularized 
authority that now tolerates minorities hitherto discriminated 
against. The parties concerned must themselves reach agreement 
on the precarious delimitations between a positive liberty to prac-
tise one’s own religion and the negative liberty to remain spared of 
the religious practices of the others. (Habermas 2005: 101) 
African states, and many others,14 have not overcome or effectively regu-
lated this problem of protecting the liberty of citizens to be “spared the 
religious practices of the others” – due to either lack of interest or cau-
tious fear of aggravating tensions or overlegislating religious life. But this 
attitude/policy allows believers, and their elites, to constantly expand the 
scope of religious presence into the public domain even when that is not 
called for by relevant doctrine. 
This situation means we must further explore the conditions and 
varieties of the secular state model that is faced with worldview diversity 
and challenges to “citizenship” (see also Casanova 2014). We should relate 
this quest to studying the conditions of the production and “learning” of 
religious adherence and expression, and here a strong link with the analysis 
of social and economic processes is needed, because religious adherence 
and choice are to be interpreted not only mentalistically (ideologically) but 
also pragmatically, within contexts where material interests are at stake. 
Needless to say, belonging to or switching to a new religious group may 
offer another social network of contacts and opportunities: very important 
in conditions of insecurity, economic deprivation and failing rule-of-law 
guarantees.  
Meanwhile, scholarly debate on secularization has made clear that 
conventional underlying conceptions on the nature of religion were dis-
proportionately based on Christian and Islamic normative models that 
emphasized theology, sacred texts, prescriptive liturgy, personal conviction 
and doctrine as the “core” of religion. Religious experience is much 
broader than that and best understood when its entire range of expression 
                                                                                                    
Ignore Noise Pollution” in the Ethiopian weekly The Reporter, 7 September 
2013, online: <www.thereporterethiopia.com/index.php/opinion/letter-to-the-
editor/item/938-dont-ignore-noise-pollution> (13 April 2014). 
14  See, e.g., Weiner 2009 on the US, and Khan 2011 on Pakistan. 
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is recognized. This means taking into account the embodied practices, the 
behavioural routines and the objects and images meant to evoke the pres-
ence of divine or non-visible forces. This all goes beyond the classic theo-
logical view of religion and moves towards an appraisal of it as culture, as a 
psychosocially rooted repertoire that informs behaviour patterns and is 
constituted in social action. This makes it indeed much more difficult to 
follow the classic secular political ideal of “separating” religion and state. 
For instance, the (over)production of acoustic religious noise is defended 
by believers as being “necessary” to their religious expression – despite the 
fact that it is not acceptable to other believers. Many other examples of 
problematic, “expansive” practices of religion can be adduced.15 The chal-
lenge is, following Habermas’ call cited above, to put into effect reasonable 
restraint (see also Habermas 2011). 
Finding an easy and one-size-fits-all “solution” of how to define the 
political-legal relationship between religion and state, and/or what has 
come to be known as the public sphere, is not possible. In the rest of the 
world, including the West (cf. discussions in Mendieta and VanAnt-
werpen 2011), this is also a durable point of contention. But the idea that 
religion in African societies always enters politics via the widely held 
belief that the spiritual, non-visible world is one with the observable 
world and influences people’s actions does not imply that “regulation” or 
understanding of religion does not have to be negotiated. As stated ear-
lier, the very fact of the enduring plurality of worldviews, aims and aspi-
rations makes this negotiation a necessity. It is not difficult to compre-
hend that Muslims cannot accept policy or public domain claims by 
Christians on the basis of Christian theological motives, and the same is 
true vice versa. Traditional religionists would have trouble with both, not 
to mention with agnostics or other minorities. In fact, vehement public 
polemics regularly flare up on this. Such an appeal to specific religious 
motivations in the public arena – but more seriously, especially in the 
formal political arena of a parliament – would be, as philosopher Richard 
Rorty has said (1999, 2003), a “conversation stopper”: Nothing more can 
be said if someone says, “This law or rule must be imposed because it is 
the will of God/Allah.” Religious people acting as such in the political 
arena cannot/will not discuss dearly held first principles of their faith. 
15  See Hackett 2005 (79-80) on the emergence of forms of “separationism and 
demonisation of religious others”, and Hackett 2011 (874) on the “barrage of 
accusations of Satanism from Africa’s ever-burgeoning evangelical, Pentecostal 
and Charismatic sector”. 
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But for the other denominations, these principles are unacceptable.16 If 
these value statements leave the public sphere and enter formal political 
debate and decision-making, the secular state would be in danger. Philo-
sophically speaking, appeals to “justification” on the basis of religious or 
any non-arguable belief are non-applicable. 
The development of a balanced formula of public-political repre-
sentation of religious communities within the African state17 has often 
been hindered by the failings of democratic decision-making, lack of 
juridical equity, and informal pressure politics. The wave of democrati-
zation since the early 1990s has led to a paradoxical result: greater reli-
gious freedoms, but also more political impasses – in only a few coun-
tries are deliberative-democratic systems solidly in place. Religion now 
seems the alternative discourse of “empowerment”, but its nature and 
limits in public space within the African state are not well defined.18 That 
people are empowered via their religious affiliation rather than via poli-
tics is certainly true19 but does not obviate the need for the political 
sphere or the state to facilitate this “empowerment” for all the different 
religious groups and thereby to regulate it.  
We have already seen (following Casanova 2006 a, b) that moderni-
zation has not led to secularization in the sense of a loss of religious faith 
and relegation of it to the private sphere everywhere, least so in Africa. 
This is not the standard, and in that respect a “post-secularization” the-
ory is called for. But, as for instance the Muslim protests in Ethiopia 
have made clear, the normative secular state model is not dead. The 
popular protests and backlash in Egypt against President Morsi’s politics 
in 2013 have also illustrated this. In a way, the Egyptian case may even 
16  They could only join on shared religiously motivated concerns, e.g., opposition 
to abortion rights, gay rights, women’s rights, etc. – as they often did. 
17  This need for accommodative negotiation in the political sphere is of course 
also separate from the problems of evaluating the truth claims that religions also 
inherently possess, as explanatory blueprints to ultimate reality, about human 
values and, perhaps, as the sole code of morality or ethics. But, as Habermas 
(2011: 25, 27) suggests, religions have truth claims and moral intuitions that do 
contribute to public sphere debates, although they need “translation” – discur-
sive adaptation – to be taken up by larger audiences in society. 
18  This is due partly to the problems and lack of scope that civil society has: as in 
Ethiopia, where legal restrictions and repression (2009 NGO law) have pre-
vented meaningful dialogue and experimentation with civic action by social, 
ethnic and religious groups. 
19  For example, the successful Redeemed Christian Church of God in Nigeria, or 
the Qale Hiwot Evangelical Church in Ethiopia, which undertake major social 
and economic initiatives. 
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be crucial for global debates on the public sphere and secularism, and 
notably in the Muslim world. In general, the secular regime should be 
developed and adapted to African conditions, recognizing that religious 
life in Africa is ubiquitous in its material, auditory and visual-performa-
tive dimensions. 
In line with recent findings from African political anthropology, to 
elaborate an overarching constitutional state structure that gives religious 
communities recognition and power and tolerates their performance 
would be more successful if continuity with the past and existing religious 
traditions is respected – not only Christian and Muslim traditions, but also 
the heritage of ethno-religious, “traditional” belief systems. These tradi-
tions still define the cultural and personal commitments of the majority of 
citizens, though it is difficult to see how one of them could claim ultimate 
hegemony over others. Religious freedom does not imply that a non-secu-
lar state order is called for: Perhaps indeed the opposite is true.20 There are 
numerous examples of religion-based constituencies that ban certain key 
policy issues from the political agenda, and that is problematic, to say the 
least. I am reminded of religious groups, in Ethiopia and elsewhere, who 
have tried to prevent debates about environmental and population policies 
and gender rights. But despite the need to regulate religious freedom in a 
neutral political dispensation, and despite the presence of the political and 
cultural heritage necessary to constructively deal with this issue, processes 
of negotiation over such an order are not always pursued effectively in 
Africa, because state political expediency and opportunism, and sometimes 
foreign interference, prevent this.  
To recapitulate, a secular statute does not necessarily deny or oppose 
the religiosity of the African public but aims to mediate potential value 
conflict. In fact, the more religious people become, the more the need may 
arise for a secular state order where each person can be his or her religious 
self. But this order can only be a precarious, negotiated one, where identi-
ties are “nested” and recognized on various levels (subsumed under the 
“citizenship” concept). This debate will be with us throughout the coming 
decades and will stimulate civic and political “engineering” in Africa.21 
20  Hackett (2011: 878) has the tendency to “absolutize” the right to religious 
freedom. But religion is not sacrosanct or above the law, because its values and 
precepts frequently clash with broader human rights values of the modern 
global age and thus need mediated adjustment. See also Eberle’s excellent ar-
gument (2009). 
21  But probably the classic secular state model – developed in Europe and the US, 
but also taken up by India in 1948 – with a full “separation” of religion and 
state functions, will not be emulated. 
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Religious identities in Africa will persist in claiming people’s alle-
giance, providing frames of meaning and practice for many, and continue 
to function as channels for the politics of identity, including the more 
violent varieties. Religious agendas thus will always challenge African po-
litical regimes, urging innovative models of a secular, or perhaps “post-
secular”, state that may allow the performance of religious identities in 
visual and material form and their controlled inclusion in consultative 
public or political discourse. But, to come back to Habermas (2011: 64), 
they still need a kind of “translation”.22 Absent this, aggressive, direct 
confrontations would be the order of the day. Of course, in any secular 
state context the mere “toleration” of the expressions and materialities of 
religion – public performances, the practical aspects, the soundscape, the 
ritual practices – is never all there is to it, because religions always remain 
“statements”, with a clear ideational content which also is publicly evalu-
ated, in the sense of being criticized and debated. But this is exactly why a 
renewed secular legal order is needed and would have a future in Africa, 
however dominant religious worldviews may continue to be. 
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Religion und Politik in Afrika: Die Zukunft des “Säkularen” 
Zusammenfassung: Dieser Essay widmet sich der nach wie vor großen 
Bedeutung der Religion in Afrika, nicht nur in Bezug auf die Anzahl der 
Gläubigen, sondern auch in Bezug auf die Varianten religiöser Erfahrung 
und ihre Verbindungen zu Politik und Öffentlichkeit. Parallel zur Demo-
kratisierungswelle und zur ökonomischen Liberalisierung seit den 1990er 
Jahren wurde Religion öffentlich immer präsenter und wurde in der Politik 
immer stärker Bezug auf Religion genommen. Neben „Entwicklung“ wird 
Religion in den politischen Debatten auf dem Kontinent ein wichtiges 
Thema bleiben. Die erneute Präsenz von Religion im öffentlichen Raum 
hat zu einem neuen Verständnis ihrer Bedeutung bei der Bildung von 
Weltsichten und politischen Identitäten geführt. Damit werden auch die 
Herausforderungen auf der Tagesordnung bleiben, die mit der Rolle und 
dem Status von Religion in einem „säkularen Staatsmodell“, wie es in den 
meisten Staaten Afrikas gewählt wurde, verbunden sind. Können diese 
von Gläubigen „bedrängten“ Staaten ihre Neutralität gegenüber unter-
schiedlichen Weltsichten bewahren – und wenn ja, wie? Diese Fragen 
werden hier übergreifend diskutiert, aber unter Bezug auf  Beispiele aus 
Afrika, die teilweise auf Erfahrungen des Autors während seiner Feldfor-
schungen zurückgehen. Der Autor plädiert für die Entwicklung einer 
neuen Art des „Säkularstaats“ in Afrika, in dem die religiösen Bindungen 
unterschiedlicher Bevölkerungsgruppen respektiert werden. 
Schlagwörter: Afrika, Staat, Religion, soziokultureller Wandel, Wechsel-
beziehungen Religion und Politik, Sozialwissenschaften 
 
